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Sunday, November 8, 2026

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SG on X

So you got an LLM to spin out a fancy DCF model for you, or maybe you hacked one together in Excel. How do you account for changes in outstanding shares? Most use a linear assumption. That might work for a company that throws off steady FCF, has limited SBC, and consistently buys back shares. For these, share count often shrinks predictably. But for money losing companies, its usually just a poorly reasoned throw-shit-at-the-wall guess. That's a problem. Dilution is the greatest threat to these names, and Wall Street's DCF models never give it serious contemplation. Example: show me an analyst who modeled in 2024 that $SPCE would 7x its outstanding share count. There are none.
@convequity

Convequity on X

Thoughts on Elon's recent neocloud comments "Neocloud" has always been a weak label. These businesses aren't really clouds, and they aren't particularly new. The more accurate term is GPU VPS. Most of them rent bare-metal GPUs. They generally don't offer redundancy across three availability zones, and they don't sell hundreds of platform services on top of the hardware the way a true cloud does. That puts them closer to VPS providers than to cloud platforms. CPU history shows the difference. CPU cloud concentrated among three to five players because platform services lock customers in and drive a demand flywheel. Customers use more of the stack over time, rather than only renting the hardware. That is how AWS-style clouds kept high margins and strong moats. CPU VPS went the other way: many providers selling essentially the same product, in a brutally competitive, commoditized market. If GPU supply stops being constrained by chips or energy, GPU VPS starts to look like CPU VPS, with gross margins of something like 50%. Better marketing and operations can lift margins and grow revenue, but they won't push gross margins to 75-80%. That is the long-term risk Musk pointed to when he predicted most neoclouds would go out of business. Most of these names are VPS businesses earning cloud-like profits and valuations from a temporary imbalance between supply and demand. $CRWV is part of that group. CoreWeave and $NBIS are also the two furthest from a pure GPU VPS, because both already sell platform services on top of the GPUs. CoreWeave is still the most exposed on financing. It pushed hard to maximize margins on each contract and took on interest-rate risk against fixed contracted revenue. Its counterparties, OpenAI, $MSFT and $META, may have played those deals more intelligently. So CRWV is the most vulnerable name on its balance sheet, yet one of the least commodity-like on product. That gap is where the return potential sits for investors willing to stick with CRWV.

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Post Q3 EVC Update

EVC's Q3 update cites $30 million for a single station, a broadcast-business sale and stronger positioning for 2027.

EVC $832M
Nat Stewart - Stock Picking Newsletter 23 clicks
TNLIF · long

Trainline PLC

Trainline’s buyback and high free-cash-flow yield support a long thesis.

TNLIF $903M
Value Investors Club 1 click

Entravision Q3 Update

Entravision’s Q3 ad-tech revenue reached $177.2 million, up 133% year over year, while total revenue rose 88% to $226.3 million and diluted…

EVC $832M
The Value Road 4 clicks

Axon 3Q26 Business Update

Axon cut full-year guidance after delayed federal Dedrone contracts slowed 3Q revenue growth to 28%, while software and services grew 43%.

AXON $31B
Speedwell Memos 3 clicks

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