X
Everything we have picked from this writer, newest first.
The analogy gets better... it took medallion 3 years to successfully expand from FICC markets to equities. Required a completely different data set and tick-by-tick data. They lost money the first couple of years, but eventually became their largest market. Feels similar. $APP
I think $MELI's up for same reason $SE's up. Signs that Sea's reinvestment cycle is turning (or least not as aggressive as feared - see the 2H ebitda guide), which means less pressure on MELI. And maybe MELI margins have found a bottom / will inflect soon too. + Just maybe, both can co-exist & grow 50% y/y.
Well, looks like $RKT vacuumed up the entire industry's refi volumes. Not only PennyMac. And 30 yr fixed just hit the lowest in 3.5 years this week. https://t.co/fqJ4bNkmiF
Happy to share our Q4 2025 letter. Especially at a time when the future of internet and software business models are being questioned. In it, we offer our take on: - The "AI Scare Trade". The market is pricing in fear, not facts. These businesses aren't broken (yet), but investors are selling indiscriminately. - What's still investable? Software faces real headwinds - disruption to terminal value assumptions and forced pricing model shifts. But ~80% of a software company's value is trust, reliability, and headache-free solutions. That doesn't disappear overnight. - Network effects are real moats. Gaming, ecommerce, consumer internet - they're all down substantially from highs. But as AI reduces barriers to entry, the barriers to scale go up. Distribution grows more valuable. - Thoughts on $SE, after a -45% drawdown. We don't think the TikTok boogeyman is as scary as the market fears. In fact, the opposite. - New Oriental $EDU exit. Originally bought near net cash, and business has stabilized since. Time to move on. Full letter linked here: https://t.co/0WPoxoHt7t
Key Take-Aways from @ballmatthew 's State of Video Games Report: 1. In-App Advertising 2x'd in last 5 years $APP 2. Mobile in-app ads is almost as big as PC & Console Spend combined 😲 3. 65% of mobile games revenue comes from mid & low end smartphone users $SE 4. "Rest of World" (SE Asia, Latam, etc) accounted for all of the growth since 2021.
AppLovin - Interview with Xiaochuan (architect of $APP's Axon engine). Thought this was the most in-depth public conversation on AppLovin's business to date. (P.S. Youtube has great subtitle translation) Axon & Technical Philosophy - Axon was built by just 5 people in 3 months - AppLovin was the first to implement models with prediction windows exceeding 7 days - Deliberately avoids developing its own LLMs, preferring to use the best available models on the market — building LLMs in-house wouldn't generate the best ROI E-Commerce Expansion - Decision to enter e-commerce made in May 2024, with the product launching later that year; original team was only 10 people - Entering e-commerce was effectively building a new model from scratch - The gaming and e-commerce algorithms share nothing except infrastructure and accumulated organizational experience Core Competency & Culture - AppLovin's edge isn't industry-specific — it's rooted in how the company approaches problems (the culture itself), which he believes positions them to tackle challenges well beyond gaming and e-commerce - His relish for being called an "underdog" comes through clearly throughout the interview Social Media Ambitions - Already working on building a next-generation social media platform - Strategic logic: Meta started with captive organic traffic and built an ad platform on top; AppLovin is doing the reverse - starting with the ad platform and building toward organic traffic - Owning that organic traffic, if achieved, would be a significant advantage Short Seller Response - When the short reports were published, Xiaochuan personally reviewed the systems and code to assess whether the claims had merit Hiring Philosophy - After 2023, overhauled hiring: moved to paying among the highest salaries in Silicon Valley, and shifted focus away from seasoned veterans toward people with fewer than 2 years of experience - Core belief: experience is overrated, the capacity to learn is underrated; breakthroughs come from willingness to abandon convention - "You can't operate like a large company if you don't have a large company's resources" - Most prominent AI researchers are overpriced — high visibility and intense competition drives salaries beyond their marginal value - Targets talent at the "periphery of the spotlight": technically strong but undervalued by the market, and still carrying the underdog mentality that well-known names often lack (i.e. "Moneyball") - Entire engineering org runs on fewer than 100 people https://t.co/vXaWUZGkZt
Applovin wants to launch their own social media platform next. Discussed in this interview with Xiaochuan Ge, the architect of Axon (50min mark). $APP https://t.co/9xyf9ACvSt Probably not meaningful in short-term, and who knows if it works. But this is where their roadmap is at. Also already hiring: https://t.co/SYDyI5qQlV
Seems like there's some interest. How much would you pay for an $APP dashboard updated 1x a week? Assuming the URL database grows over time? (AWS credits aren't cheap!)
It's Sunday morning, and here I am vibe-coding an Axon Pixel Tracker in EC2 with 0 coding abilities... Coming for you Yipit😆 $APP https://t.co/1Kyrhsll7h
On Applovin Ecommerce Ads $APP. (From Ecommerce Playbook podcast 3 weeks ago.) ** "So a couple things, number one: it turned out to be the third, the third largest investment out of all the channels that we, that we run for our clients over that period [Black Friday], which is wild. And that the new kid on the block popped up into the third spot... like bucked the trend. There’s no doubt in my mind that we’re going to see material, like orders of magnitude and investment into this channel for, for our clients in, in 2026 on Black Friday, Cyber Monday, the holiday. So my prediction, one last point on Black Friday: third largest investment channel, but still a relatively small portion of the whole for the weekend, a little less than 5%. So, but my prediction for this coming year in 2026 is that Applovin is going to be 15 percent, 20 percent of the total investment in Black Friday and Cyber Monday. And the indication, like the reason why, is because number one, we can deploy a lot of media dollars really fast because there’s so many impressions available, and number two, it’s performing. So the media dollars actually flowed into Applovin towards the end of that period, which is an incredible signal. So the AppLovin trend was peak, not peak on Friday, high levels on Friday, down a little bit on Monday, Tuesday, the peak was actually on Monday. I remember, you know, when this conversation first started with more than a year ago, October, right, 2024, the initial conversation was like what if this could be the third platform and some of our, as these sort of incrementality tests went through that sort of just seemed to be coming to fruition. And I would figure out like how am I going to make, if I was running an e-com brand, I would, I would say to myself, how am I going to, how am I going to make this 20% of my media investment this year? I was trying to explore in YouTube, my, my third bet would absolutely, absolutely be on AppLovin. I think what we’re saying here is like that’s happening basically is the Applovin ads is the third platform now. And so it’s time to get on." https://t.co/PBUOSe899T
Just hammering this home. For simplicity's sake, let's use round numbers for 2025: 1) J&T Order Volume Grows: 75% y/y 2) Tiktok & Other Customers Grows: 40% y/y 3) J&T Grows Market Share from 27% in 2024 > 33% in 2025 (disclosed in the 1H25 Report) 4) Non-platform % of revenue goes from 0% > 10% in 2025. All the data-points line up. Takeaway: It can be true that J&T grew 75% y/y, AND Tiktok is slowing to 40% y/y orders growth (and 30% y/y GMV). - Market narrative of Tiktok competition increasing is likely wrong. - Means that Shopee's recent spend is not a defensive move or coming from a weakened position. - In fact, they're pressing harder, while competition is weak (That's just how they operate. They waited to grow Monee loans, until the digibanks started blowing up. That's why you see an inflection in loan growth 2 years ago. Compare that to when Indo digibank NPLs started blowing up, and you'll see the correlation). Included pictures of the math (thanks ChatGPT). $SE $1519.HK
From J&T's 4Q25 call. They called out 1) winning share from competitors and 2) non-platform parcels growing (i.e. not from Shopee or TTS). So perhaps J&T's strong volume growth isn't related to TTS vs. Shopee competition? $SE $1519.HK https://t.co/Jn0UArEo04 https://t.co/pbA0DXJsD6
@TrigramPartners That's possible. All international ecom stocks have traded down the last few months. CPNG, MELI, etc. But at $107, $SE is trading at 7x 2028 EV/EBITDA, with 30% y/y EBITDA growth. Seems a bit extreme?
$SE is down -45% over the past few months. The prevailing bear case seems to hinge on two points: 1) Rising fear of TikTok Shop competition, and 2) Shopee reinvesting more heavily into logistics, capping margins at ~0.7% of GMV this year vs. prior expectations of ~1.2%. The concern is that this spend is defensive - a necessary response to TikTok rather than a choice. But alt data is telling a different story. TikTok Shop’s Southeast Asia GMV growth has slowed materially over the past few quarters - from 70%+ in 2Q25 to ~30%+ by late 2025. That’s only modestly above Shopee’s own growth rate. More notably, TikTok’s relative share vs. Shopee in Indonesia (~50% of regional GMV) has effectively flat-lined over the past year. If this data is directionally right, Shopee’s ~50 bps of reinvestment looks discretionary and offensive -widening the moat - rather than a defensive reaction to competitive pressure. And critically, that implies the margin compression is temporary, not structural. Oh, and both Shopee & Tiktok are raising take-rates. Not usually the sign of a competitor trying to aggressively take share... Curious, what am I missing? Is the -45% drawdown really just “2026 margins down > negative 2026 earnings revisions > stock down,” even if margins are likely to re-expand next year? And Shopee emerges with a wider moat after? The competitive backdrop looks like it’s improving, not deteriorating...
"We're on track to produce the highest mortgage loan production in terms of volume that we've had in four years," says $RKT CEO Varun Krishna. https://t.co/PBOdQTwuKr https://t.co/fqJ4bNkU8d
@MackinacCap Right, I'm just wondering why $RKT stock would be down -13% on this. Seems the wrong reaction?
Going thru PennyMac earnings... why is this not bullish for Rocket Mortgage $RKT? $PFSI is down on accelerated prepayments, and lacking the capacity to recapture them. Meanwhile $RKT's been embracing AI / tech to grow capacity per loan officer, and not needing additional headcount in the next cycle. $RKT also has 80% recapture rate, so their own MSR business should be protected. What are the odds these refinancing's flowed to $RKT, and they meaningfully grew market share this quarter? Am I missing something?
#Southeast Asia Logistics Where there used to be dozens of players, now there's just two that matter - Shopee Express, and J&T (>60% combined market share). In a high fixed cost business, Scale > Order Density (across both Geography x Time) > Lowest Cost per Parcel = Competitive Moat. Parcel delivery cost has declined -45% over 4 years. h/t @momentumasia. $SE $1519.HK
It feels like Bromberg might be able to turn-around the Unity story after-all. Was impressed with his admission of Unity's prior mistakes, and fact is, the new Vector product is working. Also I wasn't aware of the long-relationship between JR and Bromberg. In these turn-around situations, it always seems to work better when the new guy is familiar / trusted, instead of a complete outsider without buy-in from management or the team. Curious to see how this unfolds... $U https://t.co/u9ntzroZnR ** So, as part of the runtime fee, you raised prices right off the bat. So, you gave them what they wanted right away. MB: Yes. But as you think about the business going forward, I mentioned before the fundamental tension does still exist. We don’t have smartphones growing at the rate they were, where you’re basically surfing this secular wave. You are delivering ongoing value, every time these games are run, 80% of games or whatever it is, they’re running on a Unity Runtime, which you’re not benefiting from. At the same time, it is zero marginal cost software, it’s not like it’s costing you for it to run. That’s running on the phone, on someone else’s power and whatever it might be. So what’s the solution going forward? What was the confidence that Unity was lacking that you think they can deliver, that they weren’t previously? MB: It is my view and I think it’s now really the whole company’s view, that there are other areas of massive upside in our business, and I’ll give you a few examples. The first and most important one is our advertising business. So, the real challenge coming into Unity, by the way, coming in, and this also goes back to the runtime fee, is nobody can figure out how the advertising business and the game creation business were connected to one another. Beyond the fact that you had the customer like, “Hey, click this button over here and sign up for ads”. MB: Yeah, but there were often different people inside the same customers. So, there’s the developer and then the person buying an ad, maybe they’re not even the same person. And by the way, we had done an acquisition and so we had two different groups of people doing this and when I first started, the investors would always ask me, “Shouldn’t you just split these things up? What do they even have to do with one another?”, and in many ways that core question was also one of the drivers of the runtime idea, because the idea was no, no, no, the connection is going to be in the business model, not in the product. So because what we’re going to do is we’re going to raise prices so substantially, but we’re going to say, “Hey, you don’t have to pay that if you buy advertising from us”. Yep, that’s right. MB: So, actually we’re like, “Hey, we’re going to make sense of this acquisition we’ve done”, we’re going to make sense of these business units that aren’t integrated, by creating a business model which unites them. But also, sadly flies in the face of what customers want and articulates no additional product value so that’s just a bundling, which just feels like you’re jamming something down my throat that I don’t want. If our advertising product was more effective and more efficient, people would use it on their own. What did AppLovin get right? Because this is sort of the period ATT comes along, Unity laughs at it, “Not a big deal, doesn’t impact our business” — turns out it did impact your business. Meanwhile, AppLovin comes along, acquires MoPub, just starts really crushing it, obliterating you in particular. What did they figure out that you didn’t? And how are you going to compete with them going forward? MB: Yeah, we missed a cycle of technology investment. While we were integrating acquisitions, while we were thinking about business models and ways of getting folks to buy more advertising by bundling products, they were building a completely new machine learning stack that was fundamentally more effective and efficient than the one we were operating on. We were on a old style algorithmic ML, really not even a deeply ML stack. Much more deterministic. MB: Yeah, they were moving to neural nets and into the future. Which was the way you had to deal with ATT, was you were losing that deterministic signal, so you had to be in a probabilistic world. MB: That’s correct. And so, that’s the thing you should be up all day and night thinking about. Not movie effects. MB: Yeah, exactly. Or, “Hey, my ad business is fundamentally uncompetitive, how can I strong arm customers into buying more of it?”, the answer is the product’s uncompetitive. How do I make the product competitive? Once the product is competitive, we have all sorts of opportunities and that’s what I mean about getting out of the box. And so, what we did was we built a modern self-learning neural net system from scratch, with some of the best engineers in the world, called Vector AI, and we launched it and it had an immediate, and market positive, impact in our business. You’ve talked about using Vector AI to basically incorporate gameplay into understanding the target. How does that work? MB: Yeah. So, the part one of this was, “Hey, let’s be fundamentally more competitive on our ad business”. Part two is, how do you think through, as you mentioned, those real connections between advertising, game creation, and the runtime? What actually connects those things? And what connects those things is the need to have a really deep and clear understanding of the gaming consumer, because that sits inside how you succeed in all phases of the game business. Whether you’re prototyping a new game, and want to understand how people are behaving in that game, and what’s engaging them, and what’s causing them to transact, and what’s causing them to quit, and what’s causing them to make friends, all that is a data challenge. How do I interpret data which we can have access to through the runtime, as a way of better understanding how to build a game? And then when I’m operating in live service, how do I use that same connection to consumer understanding to optimize my live service?
Forrest's latest memo echoes his recent podcast interview - belief that the AI platform-shift has created a window of opportunity. For Sea Ltd $SE to be a $1TN company, if they play their cards right. https://t.co/s9IiqSfd4w https://t.co/Q5AEMfnl7P https://t.co/EYgD8uK51z
We published our latest Q2 2025 investor letter. In it, we discuss: - How can we apply the "Minimax" theory to the investing field? - Our 3 year journey with SmartRent $SMRT, and subsequent sale. - An ode to "catching crumbs" and being pirates again. Full letter is on our site here: https://t.co/6PpgEdHO4s
Shopee's SPX Express reminds me of $PDD's community group buy pick-up point locations. $SE "They are a familiar sight in Singapore. The retired “uncle” in flip-flops, slinging parcels across a housing block in an ever-practical blue Ikea bag. Or an entrepreneurial homemaker busily sorting a makeshift Shopee kiosk beside the lift. They are the human backbone of SPX Express, which now handles most of Shopee’s several billion parcels annually... With SPX Express, 90 per cent of its parcels are delivered the next day in Singapore. In the rest of Asia, almost half of SPX Express orders are delivered within two days." https://t.co/oyQtg6SZ5i
What a story... Zhang Junjie was orphaned at 10 and homeless, to illiterate at 17, to Billionaire by 32. I first tried Chagee in Shenzhen last year, and then again at their first US-outpost (Los Angeles). It's a great product, and their "Guochao" branding on point (modernized traditional Chinese aesthetic). From Haidilao & Tai Er, to Luckin, HeyTea, and now Chagee entering the US, pretty excited to watch US consumers finally be introduced to upscale Chinese F&B brands (please, no more Panda Express...). $CHA
Loved this interview with Adam at Applovin $APP. Insight into his strategic thinking + the story of building a $100BN firm with almost 0 funding (just $4M total). And his decision of buying back ~25% of shares at rock-bottom prices, contributing to their massive stock performance since 2023. https://t.co/2We2q8sG8n ** My favorite quotes: "We went public in April 21. And if I remember right, by December lockups free from January 22 to December 22, I think our stock went down like 92%. Um, it was red every day. And so that it ends up setting you up for failure. Now we were really fortunate because of how we started. We were always cashflow positive. So I controlled our own destiny. We were generating, I think it was a billion dollars of EBITDA. And at the low point, I think we got to a market cap of $4 billion. And so if you think about like cash yield return, it's over 20%. It's really cheap. You could manage and buy out a company at that level with just debt. And so what we did at the low point was we buckled down, said, we've all been here a long time. Let's build really great products. That's how we're going to recover. no one's going to buy our stock at this point. There's no narrative to sell. Everyone's gone. So let's buy our own shares. And we ended up issuing a lot of stock to the team, putting in a performance equity plan, and then becoming the biggest buyer of our own shares over the next year. And so we went from bottom $9 to peak $522 years later. A large part of that, I would say, probably 20-25% of that appreciation was because we bought back 20-25% of the cap table at very low prices because we could." ** And he refuses to speak to the Pods: "And then you realize I also want to recruit investors who believe in what I'm building over time, not who are betting on the stock for a quarter. And so I ended up changing investor relations and I don't take meetings with anyone who's who's focused on what's happening next quarter in a business as robust as ours. What's happening next quarter is defined by things we did a year ago. What's happening in three to five years is what I'm focused on. And so I only spend time with people who want to align with my vision long term. And that creates a much more engaging perspective on the world and got me to start thinking about the business exactly the same way as I did when we were private. And I still operate it today that way."
