Saturday, November 7, 2026

@calvinblissett 56m ago

Calvin Blissett on X

$GTN ~$4.90. Joel Greenblatt always wanted to do an LBO, his way of doing one was finding very leveraged stocks. This is the ultimate public LBO. Gray owns local TV stations: the CBS/NBC/ABC/Fox channel in 117 US markets (~37% of homes), #1 rated in 78 of them. It gets paid three ways: local ads, fees cable and streaming companies pay to carry its channels, and a flood of political ads every other year. It is the most sensitive to political out of any broadcaster. Miller Value Partners’ latest 13F reported 7.24 million shares as of June 30, 2026, worth about $28.8 million at quarter end; the firm had increased the position by roughly 35% from the prior quarter. In recent Q they just pushed debt maturity to 2030 from 2028 ~$500M of equity on ~$6.3B of net debt + preferred. ~6.8x 2-yr avg EBITDA. Consensus FCF: $388M ‘26, $115M ‘27, $450M ‘28, or ~50% a year on average vs the market cap. The record 2026 political year ($630-640M) is going to debt: ~$1B of 10.5% notes refinanced or repurchased, another $175-200M paid down in Q4. Free options: FCC loosening ownership caps (more duopolies, M&A) and a future spectrum sale. $SPCX sensible buyer of part portfolio. Risks: core ads down mid-single digits ex-acquisitions, cord-cutting, and a former Gray VP sees retrans under “severe pressure” after 2028 (Alphasense). At 5.7x leverage the equity is a stub, so it cuts both ways. Miller Value Partners and Bill Miller Thesis: The GTN thesis is that the market was pricing Gray Television as a highly leveraged broadcaster in decline, while underestimating the cash-generating strength and value of its local stations and other assets. Miller Value Partners argued that: Gray’s local stations were often market leaders, giving the company a strong audience and an advantage in political advertising. Political ads, retransmission contract renewals, and growth in digital advertising could lift cash flow. The firm also saw potential in the Assembly production studio and, later, ATSC 3.0. That cash flow could pay down debt; if the market’s pessimism eased, the equity could be worth multiples of its then-current price. They acknowledged the debt and advertising-cycle risks. Their counterpoint was that near-term maturities were limited and that expected cash generation could support deleveraging. The particular forecasts changed over time: the 2023 letter estimated more than $2.5 billion of free cash flow over five years; the 2025 update estimated $2 billion-plus over five to six years. Those were the firm’s projections at the time, not realized results.