Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Back to today

From X

@calvinblissett

Calvin Blissett on X

$FF: $195m EV, 30-40m current EBITDA est at RIN prices. 30m in hidden Arkansas land value (1.7k A out of 2.2k not being used) Thesis: Future Fuel's economics are primarily a bet on biodiesel margins. FF owns a relatively high-cost 59-million-gallon-per-year biodiesel plant, so it generally needs stronger industry margins than larger competitors to justify running at high utilization. The reason a high-cost producer like FF can still matter is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): refiners must satisfy EPA-mandated renewable-fuel volumes, either by blending fuel or acquiring RIN credits. When mandated demand approaches or exceeds economical industry supply, the D4 RIN price rises until the marginal/high-cost producers have enough incentive to restart. FF is one of those marginal producers. That is the core thesis today. D4 RINs have risen sharply from roughly $0.50 in the depressed period to around $1.50, reflecting tighter expected supply/demand, while the EPA's much higher 2026–27 requirements should require substantially more biomass-based diesel production. If the industry remains short of required supply and the RIN bank is drawn down, RINs and therefore biodiesel margins should remain high enough to keep FF operating profitably; roughly speaking, every $0.10/gallon of sustainable margin on ~50 million gallons equals ~$5 million of annual operating profit. A return toward $0.30–$0.50/gallon margins could mean ~$15–25 million of biodiesel operating profit, versus very little or losses when margins collapse. The catalysts are higher plant utilization, continued tight D4 RIN supply/2027 RIN-bank depletion, and stronger chemicals earnings; the major risk is the opposite—RIN prices fall because supply increases, EPA policy weakens demand, exemptions expand, or renewable-diesel capacity overwhelms the market. In simple terms: FF is the expensive factory that the market may now need to run, and the RIN price is effectively what determines whether it gets paid enough to do so.
@StableBread

Fajasy on X

At ~$6.8M net of cash, Nubeva Technologies $NBVAF (TSXV: $NBVA) trades below every one of the five small ransomware-security deals I found with a disclosed price. That’s a CAD$13.0M market cap at CAD$0.185/share (70,173,783 × CAD$0.185), or $9.3M at 1.40 USD/CAD, with the $2.49M of cash and $12,262 of debt netted out. The $6.8M buys two granted patents, two pending applications, the unfinished AI decryptor builder, and a deployment agreement with what Nubeva calls a top-10 global bank, on $500,586 of FY2026 revenue. Here’s what larger security firms paid for five small companies that detect, stop, or recover from ransomware, per the buyers’ filings: → Smokescreen (June 2021): Zscaler $ZS paid ~$11.7M in cash for a startup that plants decoys to catch attackers. → TrapX Security (January 2022): Commvault $CVLT paid $18.65M in cash for an Israeli decoy-technology company. → Minerva Labs (March 2023): Rapid7 $RPD paid $34.6M for a 14-person Israeli startup selling anti-evasion and ransomware-prevention software. → Appranix (April 2024): Commvault paid $26.27M in cash and stock for a Boston startup that cuts the time to rebuild cloud applications after an attack. → Airgap Networks (April 2024): Zscaler paid $124.4M for an “early-stage” network-security company whose product it called a “ransomware kill switch.” For context, Commvault bought TrapX and Appranix as product lines already bringing in ~$3.2M and ~$2.4M a year. Rapid7 and Zscaler bought Minerva Labs and Airgap mainly for their technology. A buyer would be paying for Nubeva’s technology too, meaning four AI patents (assuming the last two come through), the key-capture agent, and a top-10 bank as a reference account (if the license customer renewed), not just ~$500K of revenue. Still, Nubeva’s revenue is a fifth or less of what TrapX and Appranix brought in, and 82% of its revenue comes from two customers, one of which may not have renewed. So I’d put a sale at the low end of these deals, $12-19M (Smokescreen to TrapX), or CAD$0.23-0.37/share, 1.3-2.0x from here. The ~$26M median (2.8x) is the more bullish upside case. If nothing works, two more years of burn leave $0.93-1.29M of cash, and adding the two granted patents and what’s left of the business gets shareholders $1.33-2.01M, or CAD$0.03-0.04/share, a 78-86% loss from CAD$0.185. In other words, CAD$0.185 sits ~45% of the way between the CAD$0.03-0.04 floor and a TrapX-size sale (CAD$0.37/share). If those are the only two outcomes, the market is pricing a sale as close to a coin flip.

Carecloud News

CareCloud may attract a private-equity buyer after its Q3 call, with acquiring enough shares the main obstacle to a take-private deal.

Build-A-Bear: A Narrower Path

Build-A-Bear's push into prestuffed toys and broader retail distribution tests brand stretchability, but recent results warrant caution.

Twenty Years in the Dark

Tower Properties, $TPRP, went dark after a 2006 squeeze-out cut holders below 300, leaving a Kemper-controlled apartment and office…

TSOH Weekly Roundup (10/16/2026)

Bumble agreed to a $1.3 billion take-private deal, while Netflix cut about 1,000 jobs and Meta discussed its Muse superintelligence models.

CHGG · long

Chegg Inc

Chegg is framed as a binary long with 500% upside against 20% downside.

Publications we follow

Every publication on this site, hand-picked.

129 publications

Newsletters 109

X accounts we follow

Every account on this site, hand-picked.

90 accounts

Investor letters we follow

190 firms

Sectors

Ordered by how often our editor reaches for them.