Thursday, October 22, 2026

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Unicycive (UNCY):

Unicycive’s oxylanthanum carbonate NDA earned a March 25, 2027 PDUFA date after two manufacturing-related rejections, with no FDA clinical or safety concerns.

From X

@calvinblissett

Calvin Blissett on X

$TLF: Tandy Leather Factory (TLF) is the dominant specialty retailer and wholesaler of leather, tools, hardware, dyes, and DIY kits for leathercraft, with ~101 stores plus e-commerce serving a niche hobbyist and artisan base; its narrow moat stems from a 100+ year brand, unmatched physical store network that doubles as hands-on community and education hubs (classes, expert staff, ability to feel product quality), and a deep proprietary assortment of kits/tools that general craft chains cannot match, supporting high gross margins (recently expanding toward 65%) and modest customer stickiness. At ~$2.55/share it has a market cap of ~$21M and enterprise value of ~$43M (with ~$28M debt/leases vs. ~$6.4M cash); it trades at a steep discount to tangible book value of $47M ($5.73/share, P/B ~0.45x) and working capital of ~$35M, both well above the market cap, implying liquidation value (even after conservative discounts on inventory) exceeds the equity value and provides a meaningful margin of safety. Capital allocation has featured large special dividends (including ~$6.1M or $0.75/share in early 2026, partly from prior asset sales) with an unused $5M buyback authorization, while recent investments in a new headquarters/flagship and systems pressured cash. Future growth is modest, driven by pricing power, e-commerce/nontraditional channels, and expense discipline in a flat-to-declining niche rather than volume expansion. LTM Owner’s Earnings (FCF) are negative at roughly -$2.3M due to operating outflows and elevated CapEx; next-12-month figures should improve toward breakeven or modestly positive as one-time spending normalizes and margins hold. Likely catalysts include sustained operating profitability and positive free cash generation (already evident in recent quarterly margin gains and small profits), potential further capital returns if cash rebuilds, and deep-value attention given the low float and discount to book; risks center on consumer discretionary sensitivity, rising occupancy costs, competition, and inventory management.
@calvinblissett

Calvin Blissett on X

$FF: $195m EV, 30-40m current EBITDA est at RIN prices. 30m in hidden Arkansas land value (1.7k A out of 2.2k not being used) Thesis: Future Fuel's economics are primarily a bet on biodiesel margins. FF owns a relatively high-cost 59-million-gallon-per-year biodiesel plant, so it generally needs stronger industry margins than larger competitors to justify running at high utilization. The reason a high-cost producer like FF can still matter is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): refiners must satisfy EPA-mandated renewable-fuel volumes, either by blending fuel or acquiring RIN credits. When mandated demand approaches or exceeds economical industry supply, the D4 RIN price rises until the marginal/high-cost producers have enough incentive to restart. FF is one of those marginal producers. That is the core thesis today. D4 RINs have risen sharply from roughly $0.50 in the depressed period to around $1.50, reflecting tighter expected supply/demand, while the EPA's much higher 2026–27 requirements should require substantially more biomass-based diesel production. If the industry remains short of required supply and the RIN bank is drawn down, RINs and therefore biodiesel margins should remain high enough to keep FF operating profitably; roughly speaking, every $0.10/gallon of sustainable margin on ~50 million gallons equals ~$5 million of annual operating profit. A return toward $0.30–$0.50/gallon margins could mean ~$15–25 million of biodiesel operating profit, versus very little or losses when margins collapse. The catalysts are higher plant utilization, continued tight D4 RIN supply/2027 RIN-bank depletion, and stronger chemicals earnings; the major risk is the opposite—RIN prices fall because supply increases, EPA policy weakens demand, exemptions expand, or renewable-diesel capacity overwhelms the market. In simple terms: FF is the expensive factory that the market may now need to run, and the RIN price is effectively what determines whether it gets paid enough to do so.

Moon River Moly: Research Note

Moon River Moly’s updated Davidson PEA lifts after-tax NPV to $1.24 billion as flotation raises tungsten output 350% and cuts molybdenum…

Carecloud News

CareCloud may attract a private-equity buyer after its Q3 call, with acquiring enough shares the main obstacle to a take-private deal.

LXS.DE: a 2028 sale it can force

Lanxess can force Advent to buy at least half its Envalior stake in April 2028, potentially raising about €745 million to reduce net debt.

Build-A-Bear: A Narrower Path

Build-A-Bear's push into prestuffed toys and broader retail distribution tests brand stretchability, but recent results warrant caution.

UNCY · long

Unicycive Therapeutics INC

Unicycive Therapeutics fell nearly 50% after a second FDA Complete Response Letter tied to a third-party manufacturer for its primary…

Twenty Years in the Dark

Tower Properties, $TPRP, went dark after a 2006 squeeze-out cut holders below 300, leaving a Kemper-controlled apartment and office…

TSOH Weekly Roundup (10/16/2026)

Bumble agreed to a $1.3 billion take-private deal, while Netflix cut about 1,000 jobs and Meta discussed its Muse superintelligence models.

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