Monday, September 14, 2026

@negligible_cap Sep 4

Negligible Capital on X

Why has $LULU never tried to buildout specialized yoga studios or acquire a chain like Corepower? Seems like it would be a great way to get more stable / recurring revenue via memberships and a good opportunity to cross sell products and attract the companies core clientele (fit yoga girls? I don't even know anymore man)

@ACapitalLP Sep 4

A Capital on X

@everyonehatesp1 Idk but the lack of insight on coal names yesterday cost me this trade. Do better. $METC

@Fierce__beast Sep 4 1 click

Fierce_beast on X

@FishtownCap Are there any decent food brand stocks any more? $MDLZ also seems troubled

@ACapitalLP Sep 4

A Capital on X

@SurfShopCapital Thoughts on $PURR here?

@leevalueroach Sep 4 2 clicks

Lee Roach on X

Rayonier $RYN owns 4,003,000 acres across eleven states. Here's what happens when you value everything else on the balance sheet and subtract it. Enterprise value is $7.64B. Market cap $6.19B plus $1.45B of net debt. Now take out the pieces that aren't dirt: Six sawmills and a plywood mill, $1.0B. Cross-checked two ways. Replacement cost runs ~$700/MBF on 1,155 MMBF of capacity. Mid-cycle EBITDA of $175M at 6x gets you the same place. Three master-planned communities, $482M. Wildlight north of Jacksonville, Heartwood next to Hyundai's $7.59B plant in Georgia, Chenal Valley in Little Rock at 70% sold out. DCF'd at 12%. The rural land program, $650M. They sold 7,490 acres at $5,439 last quarter against a portfolio the market marks at $1,447. That 3.7x spread on ~30,000 acres a year, decayed and discounted over a 13-year runway. Solar options on 77,000 acres, $125M at a 25% conversion assumption. Carbon storage across 154,000 acres, $80M. Smackover lithium, $30M. Real geology, ten cents a share. The below-market debt mark, $130M, audited on the balance sheet. That leaves $5.14B for the timberland. Now subtract the trees. 188M tons of standing merchantable inventory at current TimberMart-South stumpage, with pine sawtimber at $23.34/ton and pulpwood at $5.40, is $3.57B. Residual: $1.57B of bare land across 4,003,000 acres. $393 an acre. Cutover land in the South, meaning ground that was just harvested with zero merchantable timber on it, transacts between $1,200 and $1,800. Three marks you can check yourself: In August the company sold 36,000 Washington acres at $4,028 and bought 57,000 Texas and Alabama acres at $2,561. Same month, same management. They paid 77% more than the market credits them for what they already own. Morgan Stanley's fairness opinion produced $47.55 to $55.80 on a DCF and $20.85 to $25.20 on trading comps in the same document. The stock is at $20.81. That gap is institutional cost of capital at 7% versus public equity demanding 9 to 10%, applied to an asset with thirty-year cash flows. Management bought back 4.9M shares for $103.5M in H1 and repaid a $200M term loan with cash rather than refinance it. I built the whole thing a second way, from transaction comps by state instead of tons and dirt. $31.80 versus $31.66. Bear case marks the entire South at $1,700/acre, puts the mills at a trough multiple, converts solar at 15%, and still lands at $24.74. Every case sits above the current price. One caveat I'll state myself: the $393 assumes rural HBU is a separate asset. Treat it as embedded in land value instead and you get $555. Still under cutover. The conclusion holds either way. Full work, every input shown, plus the part about the debt structure that I think almost nobody is modeling, linked below.

@leevalueroach Sep 4 3 clicks

Lee Roach on X

Buying PayPal $PYPL when Wall Street idiots sell this off and waiting for another takeover rumor to dump it back to them is like taking candy from a baby. https://t.co/q4OLppPbgm https://t.co/vVLuLhy0w1

@ACapitalLP Sep 4 1 click

A Capital on X

The best trades are where perception <> reality. A common trader exercise is to ask yourself: who is on the other side of the trade and why are they selling to you? What information do they have? Are they more informed than you? The best opportunities are where the seller isn’t more informed, they’re simply misinformed about what’s actually going on. Take $OWL, where the prevailing narrative was a private credit apocalypse, but you did the work and saw the residual value in the fund stakes business and an overblown level of negative sentiment. Or $TLN, where Governor Josh Shapiro and CNN want you to believe data centers are the problem, while the thirst for compute, contractual cash flows and need for electricity remain undeniable. The narrative may work against you initially. That’s often what creates the opportunity. But if your work is thorough enough, your thesis is right and you can hang in there, the gap between perception and reality eventually closes. That’s where alpha is made.

@kab604 Sep 4 3 clicks

kab60 on X

@pande40745264 @guptavinay Haven't followed QXO closely given it seemed outrageously priced, but a big attraction with these distributors are the countercyclical cashflow... Leverage @ $BLDR looks high, but unsecured notes not due until 2030-2032, and they should turn that inventory into cash