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Wednesday, November 18, 2026

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Envisioning Entravision

Entravision’s AdTech revenue rose 133% and EBIT 261% in Q3 as management weighs TV-station sales before its TelevisaUnivision agreement expires.

From X

Undiscovered Compounders on X

$IEHC has tripled this year on its backlog, which went from $13M to $56M+ in under 1.5 years. IEH is a family business in Brooklyn that makes connectors for US missiles and radars. We think a good part of that backlog is the defense giants stocking up early, and that orders will then settle at a plateau. From here, the stock depends on 2 things: how fast IEH’s plant can deliver without letting the primes down, and at what margin. 1. In Q2, IEH booked 2.4x what it shipped + its lead times went from 12 weeks to up to 24. To sell $45M/year, it needs about 205 people vs 180 in mid-2026. Even if orders fell to the bottom of our range tomorrow, the plant would have enough work to run flat out through FY29. The risk is letting the primes down. For more than half of what it sells, IEH is the only supplier, and a prime doesn’t change sources as long as IEH meets its deadlines and quality standards. That’s far from a given. IEH has to hire + train + invest to deliver this whole backlog on time, and the bigger the backlog gets, the bigger the risk. 2. More revenue means nothing without margin, and IEH will need more margin than it has now. On a fixed cost base, volume lifts the margin (in Q1, each extra $1 of sales kept 59c after manufacturing costs, vs 33c on average). But 3 costs will weigh on a backlog sold at fixed prices: - The ramp-up itself. IEH pays its new hires before they’re productive, and Q2’s spread (what’s left of sales once manufacturing is paid for) already fell from 33.1% to 28.3%. - Wages, with a union contract that expires on March 31, 2027. That cost is certain, but it should be manageable. - Above all, gold. It’s the biggest variable: each extra $1k/oz costs about 5% of sales. It also cuts both ways: in the short term, a falling gold price lowers IEH’s costs on the orders it has already priced but not yet made. Our base case still has IEH at $50M of sales by FY29 with a 15% operating margin. So the thesis rests on IEH’s ability to hire and train people quickly while making the investments it needs, and to keep margins high (through cost control and price increases), without upsetting its primes. It’s possible: IEH already did it in 2018-2020, but not on this scale. A ramp-up this big makes for uneven quarters, in both the backlog and the margins. We think the market will misread some of them (as it often does with defense and aerospace small caps), which could give us an entry point. At the current price of $30, our 3 weighted scenarios give $43.7 per share in mid-2031, about 8% a year. That’s too little for us, given the governance risk: - In 2019, IEH found its inventory was overstated by about 1/4 and took almost 4 years to fix its financials. - The family-elected board and the auditor are still the same. - Internal control is still rated ineffective. Before Q2, our plan was to start a position at $20 and build most of it between $20 and $15. The X format forces us to leave out a LOT of nuance, bullish and bearish. The full thesis, 30k+ words, is in the deep dive (link in bio). Then Q2 came in with a record backlog, well above our estimates. It may mean our plateau (the run-rate of orders once the advance orders are absorbed) is too low, in which case we’d gladly redo our model and our entry price. We go through all of it in our Q2 update:

Kevin Mak on X

$SHAZ This is yet again one of my more contrarian picks. It’s a ~2% position in my book at these levels. The debate isn’t really about neocloud good vs. neocloud bad. It’s about whether this company fails or not, because it has generally been priced as if it will. Its cornerstone deal is a 72MW datacenter with Nvidia signed on as the anchor “floor tenant.” Basically, SHAZ is buying ~$4B of GPUs from Nvidia, leasing a powered shell from NextDC, and installing the GPUs. They will then try to find a tenant (hyperscaler, lab, etc.) to rent the GPUs. If they can’t find anyone to use the datacenter, Nvidia acts as the buyer of last resort and pays for the compute. This effectively gives SHAZ a “cheap” call option on the upside of compute. The deal is complicated: Nvidia is basically guaranteeing ~$11M/MW per year of rent, and the assumption is that any upside is shared with Nvidia roughly 50/50. The current going rate (depending on contract terms, length, prepayment, etc.) is around $19M/MW, and spot rates are closer to $30M/MW. While other companies (Firmus and CoreWeave) also have Nvidia deals, for SHAZ this deal represents about 1/3 of total capacity, so whether it works has a very large bearing on the value of the whole business. To get to the finish line, the company needs two things. First, the powered shell has to be delivered. That’s coming from NextDC, the ASX-listed operator that’s generally seen as competent and well regarded. Second, they need project-level (SPV) debt to pay for the ~$5B build-out. They have about $1.5B of cash on hand and need to finance roughly $3–4B. Can they get the debt? To be clear, they don’t need company-level (risky) debt. They need debt secured by the GPUs and the rent from the anchor tenant, which in this case is Nvidia. Whatever issues Nvidia has, its credit is still very solid. SHAZ also has to prove it can execute on the datacenter. For a company that currently has <5MW of operating datacenters, that sounds like a big task. But they’re in the process of completing and delivering their first major client datacenters and have a clear path to 30MW billable by January 2027. Going from 30MW to standing up another 72MW over 2028 doesn’t seem like a monumental leap. There’s a chance Nvidia “rug pulls” its deal with SHAZ, but I put that in the 1–2% tail. They did pause or cancel the backstop program after inking the deals with SHAZ and Firmus, and probably won’t resume it. But cancelling existing deals would be fraught with liability and bad signaling, and the exposure is a rounding error for Nvidia. Leo’s SALP holdings are probably still held by the fund (per the latest 13F, with no updated filings indicating a sale). It likely couldn’t sell to Citadel because the shares weren’t registered yet. The shares also weren’t margined, so they were probably outside the liquidation book. At this point it’s very hard, maybe impossible, for them to sell: they own ~20% of the company, and as soon as they start selling it would tank the stock (risk factor!). However, the company doesn’t need to issue equity at these levels, so a low stock price doesn’t significantly impair the business. There are a lot of twists and turns to this story. I’m not sure how much I’ll ultimately write up, but it’s worth a look if you’re interested. It’s a messy neocloud in an already very messy industry, but I think the market is being overly harsh with the discount it’s placing on the business. Disclosure: Creek Drive and its affiliated funds holds a long position in SHAZ. Views expressed are current opinions for information only, subject to change and are not investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Investing involves the risk of loss and past performance is not indicative of future performance. See the disclosures link in my bio for more important information.

Q3 Earnings Updates

Q3 updates cover Crocs, Entravision and Fiserv beats, coal and oil weakness, and Xerox’s sharp decline, testing the underlying cases for…

TSOH Weekly Roundup (11/13/2026)

Tripadvisor’s CEO and CFO will depart after weak Q3 results, while Roblox’s CEO discusses AI and Berkshire repurchases $9.6 billion of…

IEH Corporation: Research Note

IEH Corporation posted Q2 revenue growth of 51% to $10.7 million and a record $56 million backlog, led by defense and medical demand.

YSWY · long

Yesway INC

Yesway is pitched as a high-quality convenience-store operator with growth runway, trading near 8.5 times EBITDA and targeting a…

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