Friday, November 6, 2026

@kevin__mak Oct 11

Kevin Mak on X

$SPHR Update on my old friend Sphere. The recent sell off seems to be directly related to some sell-side rerating of the stock based on "soft data". I find that kind of interesting because the data has been soft for many months (see daily ticket sales chart below), and among investors that I talk to, this isn't a "surprise". (Realistically that's why the stock traded down from $170 to $130). So this "surprise, the data is weak, stock rerates down 25%" is interesting to me, but also reminds me: it's always extremely hard to figure out what the market has or hasn't "priced in". The issue with the "soft data" is that my (and many) original projections was that WoZ would trough at around 1.4-1.6m/day of sales in 2027. By the summer we observed levels of ~1.2m so that likely wasn't going to happen. Towards the end of the year, the data has inflected upwards, we're down YoY (expected, given less hype than the launch a year ago). Some of this is likely due to LV weakness in general, but I think that's a relatively small fraction of the story. Personally, I find this data interesting because A) I think it's largely meaningless to value the company B) I think the market overreacts to it I think the Sphere business is humming along extremely nicely. The concert business is consistently improving (higher numbers, better acts, more utilization). The ads and bookings businesses are healthy/growing, there are 2 (and probably more unannounced) additional Spheres working through production. What WOZ did was prove that a "hit film" could generate enormous interest/revenues/visitors to the Sphere. Whether it "levels off" at $1m/day, or $1.2m/day or $1.4m/day, doesn't matter that much because the longer term model is to consistently launch NEW films launch and generate $1.5-$2.5m/day. And they have somewhere between 2-3 new films coming out next year, and probably another 2-3 films in 2028. AI is cutting their speed (and cost) of making films dramatically. Overall I'm a buyer at these $100-$120 price levels (We're long via some short Nov $120P's that are currently in the money). Given recent price action, it's hard to say how the market reacts to the November earnings release, but I think the earnings picture has stabilized from here and the stock is setup for good fundamental catalysts driving earnings growth in 2027.

@IdeaBrunchEmail Oct 11 2 clicks

Idea Brunch on X

Idea Brunch with Chris Colvin of @BreachInletCap Tickers discussed include $BKTI, $PRG, $BATRK, $LRN, and $HGV Enjoy! https://t.co/sY3RpWR3hz

@ACapitalLP Oct 11

A Capital on X

@richtrades100 Yo $KYIV? https://t.co/KPar8yzxlq

@valuedontlie Oct 11 1 click

Colin King on X

M&A idea: $BCO closing on cash + stock acquisition of $NATL early 1Q27 Implied BCO market cap ~$5.5B post-close on $1B pro-forma FCF = 5.5x Leverage jumps to ~3.4x so they'll likely spend a few years balancing delevering No real arb situation, but worth watching...

@convequity Oct 11 6 clicks

Convequity on X

OpenAI and Anthropic will rent most of the AI capacity they plan, but mainly from the big clouds rather than the listed neoclouds Convequity's AI Bubble Barometer (ABBX) tracks the data-centre capacity each company plans and how much of it it expects to rent from partners rather than own. 1. OpenAI plans 21.2 GW, of which 18.0 GW is to be supplied by partners. Anthropic plans 13.8 GW, all of it from partners. Together the two labs plan to rent 31.8 GW. 2. That is 2.8 times the 11.2 GW that the five hyperscalers, $MSFT, $AMZN, $GOOGL, $META and $ORCL, plan to rent from others. 3. The labs' named suppliers are mostly AWS, Oracle, Google, Azure and SB Energy. CoreWeave, a listed neocloud, and Nscale, a private one, appear on the lists, but the bulk of the 31.8 GW is not with listed neoclouds. 4. The seven listed neoclouds, $CRWV, $NBIS, $IREN, $APLD, $CORZ, $CIFR and $BTDR, plan to build 33.62 GW of their own. Much of that is gross site power rather than contracted IT capacity. 5. The labs are also behind most of the recent growth in AI capacity plans. Since 14 Jul, the total capacity that the 15 ABBX companies say they plan to have has risen by 22.19 GW, from 131.23 GW to 153.42 GW on 7 Oct. OpenAI and Anthropic raising their own plans accounts for 13.7 GW of that rise (62%). We think the labs' rental demand mainly supports $AMZN, $ORCL, $GOOGL and $MSFT. The neoclouds will need to fill their pipelines largely with other customers, including the hyperscalers' own 11.2 GW of planned rentals, so we would not read the labs' plans as demand for the neoclouds.

@convequity Oct 11 4 clicks

Convequity on X

Neoclouds trade at 2.6x invested capital, less than half the hyperscalers' 6.1x The seven neoclouds in Convequity's AI Bubble Barometer (ABBX), $CRWV, $NBIS, $IREN, $APLD, $CORZ, $CIFR and $BTDR, lost 7.2% of their combined enterprise value this week, from $190.2B at the 2 Oct close to $176.5B at the 9 Oct close. Over the same week the five hyperscalers, $MSFT, $AMZN, $GOOGL, $META and $ORCL, gained 2.4%, from $13,316B to $13,637B. 1. Enterprise value divided by invested capital (EV/IC) at the 9 Oct close was 2.6x for the neoclouds and 6.1x for the hyperscalers. At the 2 Oct close it was 2.8x and 6.0x. 2. ABBX estimates the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) at 14.6% for the neoclouds and 9.7% for the hyperscalers. 3. At the 9 Oct close, neocloud share prices were 20% to 45% below each stock's best Friday close since 17 Jul: CIFR −44.5%, CORZ −33.3%, BTDR −25.8%, IREN −24.6%, APLD −24.1%, CRWV −22.0% and NBIS −20.4%. Among the hyperscalers, ORCL was 10.9% below its best, AMZN and META 4.4% and GOOGL 1.3%, while MSFT closed above its best. We think most of the discount reflects the neoclouds' higher cost of capital rather than a mispricing. We would not call 2.6x cheap until they report their July to September backlog and customer prepayment figures.

@calvinblissett Oct 10

Calvin Blissett on X

$OC https://t.co/pA9b0mDR9D https://t.co/Mx02ZpE88d

@calvinblissett Oct 10 3 clicks

Calvin Blissett on X

$CHRD: 6.5x FCF, Good CEO, buying back lots of stock, low-cost pure play EP. 8% FCF yield at $60 WTI. No meaningful leverage CHRD trades at ~$142, market cap ~$7.74B, enterprise value ~$8.63B. Dividend yield ~3.7% ($5.20 annual base). Buyback/total shareholder yield is higher: policy returns ≥75% of adjusted free cash flow (mostly buybacks after the base dividend) at current low leverage (<0.5x). On 2026 guidance of ~$1.3B Adj. FCF, this implies a potential total cash return yield in the low-to-mid teens. Valuation is low: ~9.5x TTM P/E, ~7.6x forward P/E, EV/EBITDA ~3.2-3.6x, P/FCF ~6.5x. Analyst consensus PT ~$166-174 (~20%+ upside); highs to $193. Marcellus non-op sale (to POSCO, expected Q4 2026 close) provides ~$550M gross proceeds, sharpening pure-play Williston focus, boosting cash/flexibility for returns or balance-sheet strength, and removing a non-core asset. Reasons for future growth: Flat-to-low absolute oil volumes (maintenance program ~161 MBopd oil) but rising per-share metrics via efficiency and buybacks. Longer laterals (majority of program, including 4-mile) cut costs/breakevens and improve recovery; base production enhancements and lower declines support volumes with less capital. Pure-play focus post-sale plus disciplined consolidator role in the Bakken. Efficiency gains already drove material FCF improvements. LTM Owner’s Earnings (Buffett-style): Roughly Net Income + DD&A + other non-cash charges − maintenance CapEx (and normalized for WC/one-time items). For this E&P, nearly all CapEx is maintenance to offset natural declines, so Owner’s Earnings approximates free cash flow. TTM (to ~Jun 30, 2026): Operating cash flow ~$2.59B, CapEx ~$1.40B → FCF ~$1.19B. DD&A ~$1.54B; Net Income ~$841M. Company-reported adjusted FCF (preferred operational proxy) was strong in 1H26 (~$738M combined Q1+Q2) and has been running at an elevated rate. This is a rigorous, cash-based measure after the capital required to sustain the business. Expected next-12-months Owner’s Earnings: ~$1.3B adjusted free cash flow (company 2026 guidance, including derivatives, at $75 WTI / $3 HH for 2H). Why higher than LTM: stronger realized oil prices vs. prior periods, operational efficiencies (longer laterals, cost controls, base enhancements), volumes at/above high-end of prior guidance, and capital discipline (CapEx held ~$1.4B midpoint). The $550M Marcellus proceeds is one-time cash (not recurring earnings) that further supports returns and balance-sheet optionality. At ≥75% payout, this supports substantial shareholder distributions while maintaining a strong BS. Business simply: Pure-play Williston Basin (Bakken) E&P—largest operator there. Drills oil-focused horizontal wells, produces/sells crude, NGLs, and gas. High-quality inventory; shift to longer laterals improves economics. Management: Danny Brown (CEO; prior Oasis/Anadarko). Track record of efficiency, synergies, disciplined capital allocation, and per-share value creation. Capital allocation: Base dividend + aggressive buybacks under the 75%+ Adj. FCF framework (leverage-dependent). Share count reduced meaningfully; cumulative returns large relative to market cap. Maintenance production focus. Risks: Oil price sensitivity/volatility (primary driver), basin decline/inventory longevity, execution on laterals or M&A, regulatory factors in ND/MT, energy transition headwinds. Margin of safety & upside: Low leverage, high cash generation even at moderate oil prices ($60-70 WTI still supports solid FCF/returns), conservative CapEx, and efficiency gains provide protection. Upside from multiple expansion toward peers/history, continued buyback accretion to per-share metrics, operational outperformance, oil strength, and pure-play clarity. Consensus implies ~20%+ near-term upside; higher in stronger commodity scenarios. Attractive FCF yield + value profile in E&P. Figures based on company results/guidance, market data, and analyst notes as of early October 2026. Oil prices and execution remain key variables.