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Sunday, November 1, 2026

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@aleabitoreddit 1 click

Serenity on X

Last major $SIVE disclosure was 100M CW DFB laser capacity Q4 2027. And a new foundry partner (that makes 2 including Win Semi). Expected $JBL revenue coming in H1 2027 (with lasers for Jabil's 1.6T LRO scaling up H2 2027). There's channel checks along the way like CIOE where Sivers was engaged with Chinese pluggable makers + laser ASPs being raised. 70mW/100mW ranges were the most tight to Chinese pluggable makers, which was surprising. Biggest industry read through was $LITE selling out into 2029, making agreements for 2030, and having hyperscalers pay for capacity expansion for 2031. I don't think anyone has enough information to do any sort of accurate modeling for $SIVE like you can for $AAOI given they don't release product breakdown + capacity targets by quarter. The 200mW NPO lasers Sivers is sampling is likely different ASP than your 70mW lasers shipped to pluggable makers. And your custom CPO lasers are different pricing too. Like all sampling/qualification players from $AEHR to $AAOI back in 2025, usually the risk/reward comes in whether qualifications convert and what new customers they have, which is always a risk. In a bull case, if $SIVE comes online with 300m laser supply (2:1 implied ratio, already has "tremendous" supply online from likely US fab) during a structural shortage. Pluggable players like $JBL, 6 other vendors. $GFS as the reference design laser for their CPO/NPO platform. Your minor players vendors like $POET, $AEVA and other players end up scaling. And all the other custom products they hinted they were working on in the past for CPO years back. I think the probability that they cook is higher since there's so many ongoing qualifications during a bottleneck. We've already seen ownership changes from Swedish investors to US/International retail from $SIVE shareholder disclosures. My guess is that trends institutional from retail before US listing next year amid the market correction. Think people forgot institutions have already financed their expansion, which was a 700M SEK round 100%+ ago (multiple times oversubscribed). And that $SIVE uses primarily external fabs, so it's not the same as a lot of the major financing concerns affecting Neoclouds. Anyway, up to management execution, I'm not running Sivers so no clue what other companies are working with them now, whether it's Cambridge or some other US player like Semtec. TLDR: - Just need to wait for earnings for more disclosures around qualifications + partners, only so much public can guess from channel checks and supplier mapping. Not quite the same as $LITE CEO where you can see the guy on Fox news or Bloomberg interviews every week (which is a good thing)
@aleabitoreddit

Serenity on X

I can't give advice on what others should do but from what I'm seeing from $AAOI revenue ramp, it looks something like this from disclosed capacity. -> $858M Q1 2027 -> $1.29B Q2 2027 -> $1.62B Q3 2027 -> $1.89B Q4 2027 -> $2.14B Q1 2028 They're sitting on $6.8B MC right now. I'd be very impressed if they do $7.5B exit annualized revenue run rate in 2027 off 40% gross margins and markets assigned them the same valuation. And judging from $LITE making capacity agreements into 2030-2031... I don't quite think demand stalls out after 2027-2028. Anyway, lot of execution risk obviously, but H1 2027 inflection point is pretty close, so I'm personally waiting.
@ACapitalLP 53 clicks

A Capital on X

𝙒𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙝𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙙 𝙩𝙤 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙚𝙤𝙘𝙡𝙤𝙪𝙙 / 𝘼𝙄/𝙃𝙋𝘾 𝙩𝙧𝙖𝙙𝙚 𝙡𝙖𝙨𝙩 𝙬𝙚𝙚𝙠: I like distilling complex topics down to plain English. Here’s my understanding of what happened. Please correct where wrong… $CRWV and its peers rent $NVDA GPUs to AI labs and hyperscalers under multi-year take-or-pay contracts. The capex is so large relative to cash flow that the model only works if they can keep raising tens of billions a year in new financing to build what customers have already signed for. Much of that comes from secured loans backed by specific chips and contracts, while the rest comes from unsecured bonds, converts or stock. Importantly, not all secured debt is non-recourse, and many of $CRWV’s GPU loans are guaranteed by the parent. Still, the secured facilities held up considerably better than the unsecured bonds, which went from ~12% to ~15% yields, while the cost of insuring them via CDS roughly doubled… Nothing fundamental appears to have caused it. No major customer walked, GPU pricing held up, and the quarter looks fine. What happened was a cluster of headlines landing on a nervous market with the 10-year near 5.2% and hundreds of billions of AI debt issuance expected: Chamath calling it a private-credit bubble, an analyst saying the equity could go to zero, Gartner forecasting that over 80% of neoclouds stop operating independently by 2030, a few smaller peers failing to get IPOs and debt deals done. Underneath sat the bigger question of whether neoclouds are durable businesses or really just financing wrappers that hyperscalers eventually insource and cheap open-source models undercut. Once investors doubt the parent can fund growth, the stock falls, which makes the equity leg more dilutive, which worries bondholders more. Credit and equity fed on each other and the whole group fell 10-30% in sympathy. Was it justified? In three parts. (1) The $CRWV unsecured bond move was likely overdone: a company with ~$17bn of liquidity and a $129bn contracted backlog doesn’t suddenly become a distressed credit because of a handful of headlines. But backlog isn’t cash flow, and secured lenders have first claim on specific assets and cash flows, with many loans also carrying parent guarantees. The question for unsecured creditors is how much cash actually makes it back to the parent after servicing the secured debt. Still, a move to ~15% yields looks more like aggressive HF de-risking with headlines as the accelerant than a sudden collapse in the underlying business. (2) The $CRWV equity move was more understandable, just not for the headline reasons: this is a levered financing business whose equity returns depend on the cost of the marginal dollar of capital. When financing gets more expensive, the residual value on every future GW shrinks, and any gap that needs to be filled with equity becomes more dilutive. That said, unsecured bonds trading at 15% doesn’t mean every new GPU deployment costs 15% to finance. A 20% haircut for a stock that may not self-fund until 2030 could be seen as fair, but it ultimately depends on how much parent-level capital is actually required. (3) The group ($CORZ, $CIFR, $WULF) selloff was the least justified: $CRWV finances depreciating GPUs and bears the risk of obsolescence and replacement. The miners converting to HPC are increasingly financing long-lived power and data center infrastructure leased to hyperscalers under 15-20 year contracts, often with the customer owning the GPUs. Their risks are construction, power delivery and financing, not GPU replacement or compute pricing. Different assets, different contracts, different capital structures. Yet the market sold them as though they had the same problem, and that’s where the mispricing most likely sits…
@calvinblissett

Calvin Blissett on X

Farmer Mac ($AGM) Upside: ~28% to ~$265. Assumes 2027 core EPS of ~$22 (Q2 run-rate excluding a one-time $7.4 million interest recovery, growing ~12%) at 12x. Farmer Mac is the government-sponsored secondary market for agricultural and rural infrastructure loans, the “Fannie Mae of the farm.” The stock fell 12% in February after a Q4 earnings miss and has not fully recovered. At $206.92, AGM trades at about 10.5x normalized core EPS and roughly 1.8x book value, for a business with a 19% core ROE and record Q2 core earnings of $5.40 per share (+24%). The underappreciated shift is in mix. Rural infrastructure is now one of the fastest-growing parts of the business: broadband volume grew 58% and renewable energy 55% in Q2, at net effective spreads of 2.30% and 1.72%, versus 1.01% on traditional farm and ranch loans. As higher-spread infrastructure lending becomes a bigger share of $37.2 billion in total volume, Farmer Mac’s spread should expand. Its GSE status lets it fund at near-agency rates. Tier 1 capital is a healthy 13.2%.

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TSOH Weekly Roundup (10/30/2026)

Markel spent $315 million repurchasing shares in Q3 as Thrive agreed to buy ADT for $7.6 billion and Hasbro cited rising adult toy demand.

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TSOH Investment Research 1 click

Molina & Kinsale

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Bearstone 8 clicks
PSN · long

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PSN $5.6B
Value Investors Club

MYR Group q3’26 Earnings Preview

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MYRG $4.3B
Monte Independent Investment Research 6 clicks

Mosaic, Part One: The Story

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MOS $6B
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