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Sunday, October 18, 2026

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@calvinblissett 8 clicks

Calvin Blissett on X

$CCLD questions I have so far for Stephen Synder (CEO) interview if I am missing anything please let me know Charlie Munger famously talked about the importance of distinguishing between technological improvements where the economic benefits “stick to our ribs as owners” and those where “all of the advantages from great improvements are going to flow through to the customers.” (Stripe Press) I think it’s fair to say AI will lower costs overall for the RCM industry for those able to take advantage of it. McKinsey estimates that AI enablement of the revenue cycle could reduce cost to collect by 30% to 60%. (McKinsey & Company) We are already beginning to see this play out: roughly 20% to 40% of organizations report broad or enterprise-wide use of AI-enabled tools across different parts of the revenue cycle, while 70% to 90% of decision-makers expect to increase spending on AI-enabled RCM capabilities over the next three years. (Oliver Wyman) How is this playing out currently, and how do you see it progressing? More specifically, where do you think the economic benefits of AI ultimately accrue? Will AI make the strong stronger and the weak weaker—allowing scaled, technologically capable RCM providers to lower their costs faster and potentially furthering industry consolidation? Or, as AI tools become increasingly commoditized and accessible, could they instead level the playing field and erode some of CareCloud’s existing competitive cost advantage? A bit similar to the last question: Could AI change the dynamic of struggling companies not being able to upgrade products and or win clients. Allowing them to improve and compete hence lowering acquisition opportunities? How much growth aside from obviously inorganic acquisitions is existing customers expanding versus new clinics signing up? Do you think about size when acquiring or is it purely a factor of opportunity and fit. It would seem intuitive smaller acquisitions are easier and cheaper. Is there a pace or target you have in mind regarding acquisitions One shareholder asked for more metrics/metrics with news. Just granularity, Shareholder assumes it will be on earnings call but affects of data breach and portion if any that isn’t covered by insurance. What you’re seeing and anticipate seeing in terms of loss of current customers and momentum in future sales. A majority of the employees are in Pakistan which is currently going through a turbulent time and is basically a junta. Do you think there's any need to de-risk it? I believe the ROI from acquisition is at the midpoint of purchase multiple (.6-1x) and target contribution margin (25-30%) on a full year time frame after 9 months to get there to be About 34%. If your stock had the same FCF yield how would you weight buybacks vs acquisitions. Given the same assumed 34% full year after achieving targets on acquisition In Q2 2026, Hadi said: “OurAI and acquisition strategies have become a single, unified growth engine.” Does that mean that AI strategy/product development has similar economics or is it table stakes and has to be invested in merely to keep up?
@calvinblissett 3 clicks

Calvin Blissett on X

LendingTree ($TREE) Upside: ~120% to ~$54. Assumes 7x the midpoint of 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance ($148.5 million), less ~$280 million of net debt, across 14.0 million shares. The stock currently trades at about 4x. LendingTree is the largest U.S. online marketplace connecting consumers with lenders and insurers. The stock has fallen 65% from its high, first on a Q2 earnings miss and lowered guidance, then in September on a Wall Street Journal report about Meta’s “Muse” AI agent, which investors fear could let consumers shop for loans and insurance without visiting a marketplace. At $24.43, TREE trades at roughly 4x enterprise value to 2026 EBITDA guidance of $145–152 million. The AI fear overlooks two things. First, insurance is now about two-thirds of revenue ($209 million in Q2, up 42%), paid by carriers buying leads regardless of where the search starts. Second, loan brokering requires state licensing and fraud controls; management notes that ChatGPT and Gemini declined to process loan applications and referred users to marketplaces including LendingTree. Net leverage has fallen from 5.3x in 2023 to 1.9x, removing the balance-sheet risk that once hung over the stock. The disintermediation risk is real, but a 4x multiple prices in a lot of it.
@calvinblissett 1 click

Calvin Blissett on X

GAMCO Investors ($GAMI) is the value-investing asset manager founded by Mario Gabelli, with $36.6 billion of AUM. The shares trade at a steep discount largely because of structure, not operations: GAMCO voluntarily left the NYSE for the OTCQX market, which puts it outside most indexes and institutional mandates. Its public float is small, and voting control sits with non-traded Class B shares held by Gabelli’s family entity. At $25.32, GAMCO holds $231 million of cash and investments with no debt, about $11 per share, or more than 40% of the market cap. With Q2 EPS of $1.07 (up from $0.93 on 13% revenue growth), the stock trades at about 6x annualized earnings, and the operating business excluding cash at roughly 3–4x. Part of its AUM sits in closed-end funds, permanent capital that cannot be redeemed, which makes the fee stream stickier than a typical active manager’s. Key-person risk around Mr. Gabelli is real, and the recent addition of Christopher Marangi to the board supports succession.
@calvinblissett

Calvin Blissett on X

Virtus Investment Partners ($VRTS) is a multi-boutique asset manager with $152 billion of AUM. The stock has fallen about 20% since August as quality-style equity strategies suffered $14.1 billion of year-to-date outflows. At $132.29, VRTS trades at about 6x annualized adjusted EPS of $5.54 with a ~7% dividend yield, and net debt is just 0.9x EBITDA. The less obvious fact: Virtus’s average fee rate rose to 43.1bps from 41.3bps a year ago despite outflows. Lower-fee equity assets are leaving, while higher-fee alternatives ($19.7 billion of AUM) and ETFs are growing, including the 56% stake in private-credit manager Keystone, acquired in March. One caveat from the footnotes: the noncontrolling interest liability jumped to $152.5 million, largely Keystone, which signals a future obligation to buy the remaining equity. Buybacks have shrunk the share count to 6.6 million.

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LWAY · long

Lifeway Foods INC

Lifeway Foods holds 95% market share in kefir, is growing 20% to 35%, and trades at 12 times projected 2027 earnings as its capex cycle…

LWAY $335M
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Checking Out Music Royalties

Mills Music Trust's 8.5% yield faces declining distributions as songs enter the public domain, while Royalty Exchange lists more than 700…

MMTRS
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