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Sunday, October 18, 2026

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@calvinblissett 8 clicks

Calvin Blissett on X

$CCLD questions I have so far for Stephen Synder (CEO) interview if I am missing anything please let me know Charlie Munger famously talked about the importance of distinguishing between technological improvements where the economic benefits “stick to our ribs as owners” and those where “all of the advantages from great improvements are going to flow through to the customers.” (Stripe Press) I think it’s fair to say AI will lower costs overall for the RCM industry for those able to take advantage of it. McKinsey estimates that AI enablement of the revenue cycle could reduce cost to collect by 30% to 60%. (McKinsey & Company) We are already beginning to see this play out: roughly 20% to 40% of organizations report broad or enterprise-wide use of AI-enabled tools across different parts of the revenue cycle, while 70% to 90% of decision-makers expect to increase spending on AI-enabled RCM capabilities over the next three years. (Oliver Wyman) How is this playing out currently, and how do you see it progressing? More specifically, where do you think the economic benefits of AI ultimately accrue? Will AI make the strong stronger and the weak weaker—allowing scaled, technologically capable RCM providers to lower their costs faster and potentially furthering industry consolidation? Or, as AI tools become increasingly commoditized and accessible, could they instead level the playing field and erode some of CareCloud’s existing competitive cost advantage? A bit similar to the last question: Could AI change the dynamic of struggling companies not being able to upgrade products and or win clients. Allowing them to improve and compete hence lowering acquisition opportunities? How much growth aside from obviously inorganic acquisitions is existing customers expanding versus new clinics signing up? Do you think about size when acquiring or is it purely a factor of opportunity and fit. It would seem intuitive smaller acquisitions are easier and cheaper. Is there a pace or target you have in mind regarding acquisitions One shareholder asked for more metrics/metrics with news. Just granularity, Shareholder assumes it will be on earnings call but affects of data breach and portion if any that isn’t covered by insurance. What you’re seeing and anticipate seeing in terms of loss of current customers and momentum in future sales. A majority of the employees are in Pakistan which is currently going through a turbulent time and is basically a junta. Do you think there's any need to de-risk it? I believe the ROI from acquisition is at the midpoint of purchase multiple (.6-1x) and target contribution margin (25-30%) on a full year time frame after 9 months to get there to be About 34%. If your stock had the same FCF yield how would you weight buybacks vs acquisitions. Given the same assumed 34% full year after achieving targets on acquisition In Q2 2026, Hadi said: “OurAI and acquisition strategies have become a single, unified growth engine.” Does that mean that AI strategy/product development has similar economics or is it table stakes and has to be invested in merely to keep up?
@ACapitalLP 50 clicks

A Capital on X

𝙒𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙝𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙙 𝙩𝙤 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙚𝙤𝙘𝙡𝙤𝙪𝙙 / 𝘼𝙄/𝙃𝙋𝘾 𝙩𝙧𝙖𝙙𝙚 𝙡𝙖𝙨𝙩 𝙬𝙚𝙚𝙠: I like distilling complex topics down to plain English. Here’s my understanding of what happened. Please correct where wrong… $CRWV and its peers rent $NVDA GPUs to AI labs and hyperscalers under multi-year take-or-pay contracts. The capex is so large relative to cash flow that the model only works if they can keep raising tens of billions a year in new financing to build what customers have already signed for. Much of that comes from secured loans backed by specific chips and contracts, while the rest comes from unsecured bonds, converts or stock. Importantly, not all secured debt is non-recourse, and many of $CRWV’s GPU loans are guaranteed by the parent. Still, the secured facilities held up considerably better than the unsecured bonds, which went from ~12% to ~15% yields, while the cost of insuring them via CDS roughly doubled… Nothing fundamental appears to have caused it. No major customer walked, GPU pricing held up, and the quarter looks fine. What happened was a cluster of headlines landing on a nervous market with the 10-year near 5.2% and hundreds of billions of AI debt issuance expected: Chamath calling it a private-credit bubble, an analyst saying the equity could go to zero, Gartner forecasting that over 80% of neoclouds stop operating independently by 2030, a few smaller peers failing to get IPOs and debt deals done. Underneath sat the bigger question of whether neoclouds are durable businesses or really just financing wrappers that hyperscalers eventually insource and cheap open-source models undercut. Once investors doubt the parent can fund growth, the stock falls, which makes the equity leg more dilutive, which worries bondholders more. Credit and equity fed on each other and the whole group fell 10-30% in sympathy. Was it justified? In three parts. (1) The $CRWV unsecured bond move was likely overdone: a company with ~$17bn of liquidity and a $129bn contracted backlog doesn’t suddenly become a distressed credit because of a handful of headlines. But backlog isn’t cash flow, and secured lenders have first claim on specific assets and cash flows, with many loans also carrying parent guarantees. The question for unsecured creditors is how much cash actually makes it back to the parent after servicing the secured debt. Still, a move to ~15% yields looks more like aggressive HF de-risking with headlines as the accelerant than a sudden collapse in the underlying business. (2) The $CRWV equity move was more understandable, just not for the headline reasons: this is a levered financing business whose equity returns depend on the cost of the marginal dollar of capital. When financing gets more expensive, the residual value on every future GW shrinks, and any gap that needs to be filled with equity becomes more dilutive. That said, unsecured bonds trading at 15% doesn’t mean every new GPU deployment costs 15% to finance. A 20% haircut for a stock that may not self-fund until 2030 could be seen as fair, but it ultimately depends on how much parent-level capital is actually required. (3) The group ($CORZ, $CIFR, $WULF) selloff was the least justified: $CRWV finances depreciating GPUs and bears the risk of obsolescence and replacement. The miners converting to HPC are increasingly financing long-lived power and data center infrastructure leased to hyperscalers under 15-20 year contracts, often with the customer owning the GPUs. Their risks are construction, power delivery and financing, not GPU replacement or compute pricing. Different assets, different contracts, different capital structures. Yet the market sold them as though they had the same problem, and that’s where the mispricing most likely sits…

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TSOH Weekly Roundup (10/16/2026)

Bumble agreed to a $1.3 billion take-private deal, while Netflix cut about 1,000 jobs and Meta discussed its Muse superintelligence models.

BMBL $783M
TSOH Investment Research 11 clicks

PesoRama: Research Flash

PesoRama will reach 54 JOi Dollar Plus stores by November after raising C$28.4 million, funding more than 50 additional Mexican store…

TBBB $6.8B
Atrium Research - Equity Research 7 clicks

Modine Deep Dive

Modine, soon Modexus Solutions, has a $4 billion hyperscaler cooling contract but must ramp factory output and restore margins as data…

MOD $9.2B
CV's Substack 19 clicks

Seer

Seer trades at $2.04 against $3.90 per share of net cash as activists press a board that rejected five buyout proposals and won reelection.

SEER $113M
Triple S Special Situations Investing 4 clicks

Hidden in Plane Sight

An aerospace company’s profitable core is obscured by a long-running FAA development program; approval, abandonment, or shrinking losses…

ASLE $227M
The Mikro Kap 3 clicks

Stranded Indium-Phosphide

Aeva’s high-power InP SOA design could supply NPO/CPO optical modules at roughly 17% gross margins, versus 51% for eight discrete DFB…

AEVA $699M
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