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Friday, October 9, 2026

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You Understand Now, Why You Came This Way

Brazil’s October 25 runoff puts Bolsonaro’s likely victory at the center of a bullish regional-stock case; Golar LNG (GLNG) also reports fresh news.

GLNG $4.9B
WHAT ARE WE DOING? “Contrarians At The Gate” 3 clicks

From X

@StableBread

Fajasy on X

Revenue at Nubeva Technologies $NBVAF (TSXV: $NBVA) has fallen 76% since 2023, but it still has ~4 years of cash. Since losing Kroll, its biggest customer, Nubeva’s revenue has dropped from its FY2023 high of $2.07M. Expenses fell 66% over the same period, from $4.03M to $1.36M. Nubeva booked $500,586 in FY2026, across three revenue lines: 1) Software licenses ($204,055, 41% of revenue): Attributed in the MD&A “primarily” to NuRR, its ransomware-recovery product. 2) Subscriptions ($90,819, 18%): NuRR, down from $113,356 in FY2025. The December 2025 interim MD&A blamed the decline on fewer customers renewing. 3) Support and maintenance ($205,712, 41%): The last TLS (web-traffic decryption) customer, paying under a source-code and distribution agreement Nubeva kept when it sold its TLS technology in March 2024. Just two customers made up 82% of FY2026 revenue (41% each). While the concentration risk exists, both customers have continued working with Nubeva. The TLS customer has been paying since before the March 2024 sale, and the license customer since FY2025. Nubeva ended FY2026 with $2,489,316 of cash and money-market funds and no debt beyond a $12,262 pandemic-era SBA loan. Cash fell $600,162 over the year, which means runway is ~4 years ($2,489,316 / $600,162) if nothing material changes. CEO Randy Chou didn’t expect Nubeva to burn cash in 2025. In a March 4, 2024 video posted the day the TLS sale closed, he said the sale would make Nubeva cash-flow positive for calendar 2024, with 2025 “targeted to be the same.” Instead, cash fell $457,706 in the 12 months to January 31, 2026, the closest reported period to calendar 2025 ($3,184,879 to $2,727,173). In other words, the TLS sale didn’t make Nubeva self-funding, so the ~4-year runway is how long Chou has to automate support or sell. Even if both top customers churned, cash would still cover ~2.5 years of operations. Nubeva hasn’t raised equity since a CAD$1.59M private placement in February 2022, and the last warrants expired in FY2025, so dilution has been minimal.
@StableBread

Fajasy on X

Half the gold, platinum, and palladium in ore from McCreedy West, the producing mine of Magna Mining $MGMNF (TSX: $NICU), goes to Franco-Nevada $FNV for $1,200 per gold-equivalent ounce, 29.0% of the average gold price in Q4 2025. Magna inherited the deal, a precious metals stream, when it bought McCreedy West from KGHM $KGHPF, the Polish copper giant. A stream is a deal where a financier pays a miner upfront for the right to buy part of its future metal at a discount to market. Magna’s stream gives Franco-Nevada 50% of the gold, platinum, and palladium in ore from McCreedy West and “certain areas” of Levack and Podolsky, until the deposits run out or 2048. Franco-Nevada pays 60% of the monthly average gold price per gold-equivalent ounce (platinum and palladium converted into gold) from McCreedy West, capped at $1,200/oz once gold tops $2,000. In Q2 2026, the stream cut net revenue by US$3.9M, so revenue would have been ~18% higher without the stream. CEO Jason Jessup called the stream “a bit of an overhang” on McCreedy West, and in April said its terms are “definitely open for discussion” with Franco-Nevada. The higher gold climbs, the more the stream costs Magna, and I wouldn’t count on Franco-Nevada softening the terms. Crean Hill, Magna’s permitted nickel mine, carries no Franco-Nevada stream, and Jessup says R2, the high-grade zone Magna found at its flagship Levack mine, has none either. At Q4 2025’s gold price, Magna kept 64.5% of the value of McCreedy West’s gold, platinum, and palladium (50% + 50% × 29.0%). That means a stream-free ounce from Crean Hill or R2 is worth 1.55x as much to Magna as one from McCreedy West (100% / 64.5%). The stream also covers two areas of Levack, including the Morrison deposit. Franco-Nevada’s filings set the price for its Sudbury streams at $400/oz, rising 1% a year from July 2011, and its later increases applied to McCreedy West only, so Levack’s price would’ve reached ~$460/oz by Q4 2025 ($400 × 1.01^14). So at Q4 2025’s gold price, Magna would keep 55.6% of the value of Levack’s streamed ounces (50% + 50% × ($460 / $4,141.90)), less than the 64.5% it kept at McCreedy West.
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Fajasy on X

Elmet $ELMT expects Masan High-Tech Materials, its Vietnamese tungsten supplier, to stay its key refiner even after a U.S.-funded plant in Nevada comes online, and it bought 4.99% of the company for $124.75M on October 1. Masan High-Tech Materials (UPCoM: MSR) mines tungsten at Nui Phao in Vietnam, refines the concentrate into APT (ammonium paratungstate, the traded form of tungsten) and oxides, and calls itself the largest producer of processed tungsten outside China. Elmet, which turns tungsten into parts for U.S. missiles and jets, has bought from MSR for 12+ years, and the deal values MSR at $2.5B. The 55.1M shares came from a Masan Group (HOSE: MSN) subsidiary, so the $124.75M goes to MSR's parent, not into MSR. Along with the stake come (1) an MSR board seat, (2) an 18-month lockup on Elmet's MSR shares, and (3) 8+ years of supply that MSR puts at ~1,250 tonnes of WO₃ (tungsten trioxide, the standard measure of contained tungsten) a year, ~$1.5B of revenue to MSR at today's prices. That's ~$187.5M a year of spend with MSR ($1.5B / 8), equal to 82% of Elmet's $228.5M of TTM revenue. On September 14, Elmet's deck labeled ~$100M of the U.S. Department of War's (DoW) $450M "Strategic Investments in Elmet Refining & Trading," its new tungsten buying and trading division, to build a "diversified feedstock portfolio." The October 1 deck relabels the same ~$100M "Strategic Investment in Masan," and the stake cost $124.75M. At $2.5B, Elmet paid 10.7x the ~$233M of net profit MSR expects for 2026 ($2.5B / $233M). For context, APT was $3,040/MTU (metric ton unit, 10 kg of WO₃) on May 29, up from $330 in January 2025 per Elmet's deck, and Elmet's own 2031 targets assume $1,500/MTU. Elmet's 8-K also says it won't participate in MSR's 2026 interim dividends. On October 1, the day the shares traded, MSR's board proposed a second 2026 interim dividend of VND 5,000/share (Vietnamese dong). VND 5,000 is 8.5% of the VND 58,760/share Elmet paid, or ~$10.6M on its 55.1M shares. In September I wrote that Springer, the Nevada APT plant, gives Elmet the one step it didn't own: Turning tungsten concentrate into the oxide its powder line starts from. Elmet's deck calls MSR a "long-time supplier and processor of blue tungsten oxide (BTO)," so MSR already handles the conversion for Elmet. So the step Elmet didn't own in July stays with MSR, and Elmet paid 10.7x MSR's expected 2026 profit for its 4.99% while its own 2031 plan assumes APT at under half the May price.
@StableBread

Fajasy on X

My investing thesis in a nutshell (w/examples): 1) Buy with a strong margin of safety or stock price near/below cash and/or book value. 2) Buy in industries and/or markets where the money is flowing. Makes it a lot easier. 3) Buy the best early and/or the most overlooked in that particular industry. 4) Pay up for unfair advantages, excellent mgmt teams, and companies with huge latent pricing power. 5) Sell when the thesis breaks. Or a much better risk/reward setup hits your desk. Otherwise continue to add/hold. Don't track stock prices. Track the main business KPIs like any competent mgmt team would. Example #1: Bought $NBIS 4x mid $20's (best overall). Then bought $BRUN common and warrants pre-merger (most overlooked). Example #2: Bought $FTEK $1.39. Cash floor new excellent operator CEO. Strong upside potential w/data centers. Example #3: Bought $BABA $70's. Strong margin of safety, market leader, unfair advantages. Sold $170 for better risk/reward. Example #4: Bought $ELMT @$19 and @$14. Unfair advantage. Strategic. Cheap. Critical in strong growth industries. Example #5: Bought $TOST @$24. Beaten down due to macro headwinds and new/early $DASH competition. But almost everything in business stronger and expanding to new verticals. Lastly, if you're unsure or don't fully understand the business. Just say no. In fact, say no to most stocks. Most probably your best idea is already in your portfolio. Don't lockup your money in a 3/5 setup, you're trying to make outsized returns! And sub to my newsletter (link in bio) if you want my deep dives. 😉

Investor Letters

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Namib Minerals: Research Note

Namib Minerals posted H1 adjusted EBITDA of $19.0 million, up 76%, as higher gold prices offset lower production.

NAMM $62M
Atrium Research - Equity Research

Golar LNG q2’26 Operational Update

Golar LNG ordered a $2.45 billion fourth FLNG vessel, targeting 3.5MTPA of capacity and $400 million in annual EBITDA under a 20-year…

GLNG $4.9B
Monte Independent Investment Research

What I’ve Been Up To

Cogent Communications and AI data-center bottlenecks feature in a newsletter update on recruiting, financial media and conference takeaways.

CCOI $515M
Stock Thoughts 2 clicks
POST · long

Post Holdings INC

Post Holdings remains a large position after the stock's recent decline.

POST $3.3B
Value Investors Club

Solid Power Still Has Promise

Solid Power reported a $0.11 Q2 loss and $419.3 million of cash, with its electrolyte pilot line and BMW and SK On validation central to…

SLDP $528M
Quad 7 Capital 2 clicks

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