Wednesday, September 23

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Everything we published on this day.

78 stories — the front page that day →

@aleabitoreddit

Serenity on X

I’ve actually entered positions in many tiny Korean companies recently… That actively supply memory, test, machines, etc. to $MU, $SKHY, Samsung, and others like $SMTC + US companies. It’s pretty interesting what you find in the $30-$250m range for optical components, CPUs, memory, and others that are inflecting due to AI. I don’t share these names publicly since risks/volatility is enormous. But one or two going from $40M -> $400m makes the risk/reward worth it for me personally.
@aleabitoreddit

Serenity on X

So update from $LITE + Win Semi ( $SIVE ) foundry: Lumentum in a meeting with Stifel at ECOC 2026 stated: - $NVDA Spectrum-6 CPO UHP demands increased materially. - NPO as larger than CPO, with multi-wavelength external lasers lifting ASPs (Sivers offers multi wave length DFB arrays, read through on higher valued products) - Demand for UHP lasers continues to exceed supply Just a status update in terms of how the optical bottleneck is going (laser prices going up, demand exceeds supply). Digitimes also reported today Win Semi ( $SIVE foundry ) was expanding capacity for CW lasers. - "CW products... are expected to gradually emerge in the second half of 2026", with meaningful revenue contribution likely coming in 2027 and 2028. - Win has strengthened inventory management for InP substrates while moving toward 6-in InP wafers for ongoing process testing. Currently relies on Tier-1 International suppliers. - Many of this was spent on DUV tools from $ASML but (Win Semi's orders spanned machinery, equipment, and fab engineering work) So that answers a lot of questions about Sivers' partner "how is this company securing InP substrates", "4in vs 6in", "production timing" TLDR: - NPO > CPO (per Lite), multi-wavelength lasers going brrr for prices - demand > supply (continuation) - Not sure why people have been bear posting Win Semi when turns out they have everything needed to mass produce CW lasers.
@calvinblissett

Calvin Blissett on X

$IMXI now father from deal price than pre deal price. Market obviously saying deal won’t get done. I get AI treadmill math if 10x 2025 Owners Earnings (36m) but H1 2026 annualized is only 10m, FCF for H1 was like 60m due to pre paid wires working Capital benefit. What is interesting is the amount of interest and suitors that made in far before $WU agreed to buy, and also the pretty obvious value/synergies for an acquirer if regulatory hurdles as we’ve seen can be overcome
@OddDiligence 9 clicks

Odd Diligence on X

Interesting $FSLY finding from testing Meta Muse. Through a series of hundreds of tests, it appears that the $FSLY role with Meta Muse is greater than analysts have noted Over the past week, I created several test websites and ran 738 controlled tests to send traffic from Muse agents to my websites I set up analytics on my website, and I was able to track things like IP address, user agent, operating system, etc From the IP addresses, across the 738 tests, Muse sent traffic from: -Cloudflare: 37.0% -Fastly: 29.3% -Meta: 19.4% -AWS: 14.4% Cloudflare is not a surprise – as there has been a lot of analyst commentary about Muse using Cloudflare. Fastly, on the other hand, was a surprising result I ran many different situations and tasks to try to understand why, or when, Muse sends traffic through Fastly – or others. And when I looked deeper, Muse used Fastly for 100% of the tests when browser navigation was required (e.g., “go to my favorite restaurant’s website and find me the menu”). And when Muse was requested to navigate on a website (e.g., make me a doctor appointment), Fastly was used in 100% of tests Then in other situations, for example when an API is involved or a curl request required, Cloudflare was used in 100% of tests Lastly, when requesting Muse to search the web, Muse split traffic through Fastly, Cloudflare, Meta directly, and AWS
@KEDM_COM

KEDM.com on X

Visteon $VC announced a $800m buyback (~27% of the market cap) through 2029. With sluggish growth in recent years but solid FCF, cash has been building, and VC has picked up the buying. Things might become interesting again operationally as well. VC is past its toughest 2026 comps and set to inflect on growth (solid wins across 2‑wheelers, commercial vehicles, Toyota, and Asian OEMs). This could mean a return to hsd% organic growth next year, with margins returning to 13%+. Roughly 6x EV/EBITDA.
@BrokenMoats 1 click

Broken Moats on X

Fully understand the threat and disruption to OTAs from agents circumventing to direct sources (no reason for Hilton to pay to get eyeballs on their properties if theres new way to discover availability, demand and price (keep the economics) I struggle to understand the risk to $ABNB though, assuming its from price competition to list (more discoverable so go with platform that charges the least in take rates??). No real ad revenue so even if you change how people engage with the network it does not have the same impact as businesses with paid placements/rankings A long way off from people coding or buying their own booking nd payment system to let bots discover their basement is available for rent. I would add even if this was readily available its highly unlikely to be the model as both parties want an intermediary to rely on for insurance, communications, arbitration, working capital (book, pay later). Interesting to see this one caught up to the same degree think a lot of the e-commerce players with ad revenue and ranking/paid promotional revenue have a lot more at stake
@AltayCapital 1 click

AltayCap on X

$BKNG discourse regarding agents: If the interface to book changes, OTAs lose. Boutique hotels don't need to be tech savvy. They will run some white label SaaS product that interfaces with agents and handles booking. OTAs are bad for society. Huge take rates (20%+) due to rent seeking. No real innovation / value add to society. Disruption here is good. Disruption will be slow because I imagine bkng contracts will stifle adoption and agent usage is still nothing and won't be anything material for at least a decade. If bkng trades at 30 p/e, it would be an easy short. But today's valuation isn't too demanding. But still tempting to short.
@leevalueroach 1 click

Lee Roach on X

Imagine being a Wall Street suit, drooling all over your big fat belly, and refusing to buy $GME in this cycle of obese adults buying card board squares of lizards that can spit fire for 69x the cost to print. Pokemon cards still hold value better than the failing U.S. dollar. Wall Street suits are staring at their silly little models, playing with their dumb discount rate, with the inability to pleasure their wives while GameStop transformed their entire business model.
@negligible_cap 4 clicks

Negligible Capital on X

It still amazes me how long it often takes the markets to react to something like Muse META released Muse on September 8th, right around 2 weeks ago (Instinct was even earlier, at the end of August and had similar implications) You had over a full week where nothing really happened besides $META slowly moving higher. That is until Monday, where META shot up 11% and all the Muse winners (especially CPUs) and the agentic losers really started reacting. Has Muse gotten any better since it’s launch? Nope Just goes to show how much price drives the narrative
@junkbondinvest 5 clicks

junkbondinvestor on X

Anyone underwriting software credit should have a look at this When software buyers adopt frontier models, incumbent vendors see lower spend 43% of the time and flat spend 41%. Only 17% churn... This report (Qualitate) suggests FLAT spending is the stage BEFORE displacement. Buyers pause first w/o ripping out systems that are embedded in a company's ops. Look at $NOW...the AI-related pressure is due to its customers holding spending flat vs. leaving. If this is the case across levered software credit, we likely just grind lower across multiple A&Es w/o a clear hard default in the near-term
@DOMOCAPITAL 1 click

DOMO Capital Management, LLC on X

We went through how the recent sale of Pep Boys implies a $30 share price for $MNRO. Will they sell? This is where it gets interesting. About a year ago they brough in a restructuring CEO to clean-up the business (i.e. prepping it for a sale?). However, the clearest sign is this: Historically, Solomon owned 19,664 Class C shares that had more voting right than all of the common shares which was a huge impediment on any push to sell the company. However, on June 18, 2026, these shares were converted into 1,204,908 common shares (taking shares outstanding to 31.25M) after pressure from common shareholders. Essentially, Solomon was bribed with an extra 1.185M shares to give up his voting rights. If the company is sold at $30 per share that would be an extra $35M+ for Solomon. It gets even better. Remember the restructuring CEO? Well, the company also started a strategic review which includes a review of selling the entire company. Guess which banks are involved. Bank of America and Solomon Partners engagement began in May of 2026. Yes, the investment bank that Solomon funded will also be getting a cut of the deal for finding a buyer. Solomon, at 87 years old, now has every incentive possible to sell and sell quickly. And Icahn's sale of Pep Boys to Mavis just laid the groundwork. Maybe Icahn, with 33% economic interest in $MNRO, takes the $MNRO land and Mavis takes the operations. The framework already exists. The Pep Boys deal already closed. Icahn has the cash he needs to buy the land. Mavis has the cash to buy the operations.... Meanwhile.... shorts are shorting 40%+ of the float hoping for a dividend cut. The cut isn't happening, because the company is being sold...
@DOMOCAPITAL 1 click

DOMO Capital Management, LLC on X

The public markets are really sleeping on $MNRO as the recent closing of the Pep Boys sale in the private markets provides direct, concrete, and indisputable math on how to value $MNRO publicly. Here's the math: Mavis bought Pep Boys for $875,000 per store while Icahn retained ownership of the real estate. $MNRO is, without question, a better operational business than Pep Boys. If we just use $875k/store; however, we get to $975.6M. Subtract net debt of $320M gets you to a valuation of $655.6M. Just like Pep Boys, $MNRO owns its own real estate on about 290 out of its 1,115 stores. The real estate is very lucrative which is why Icahn wanted to keep it in the deal with Mavis. It's likely that the real estate is valued around $1M per store or $290M. Put it all together.... $MNRO is conservatively valued at $945.6M or $30 per share. The market is SLEEPING. It gets better....

Research Roundup Vol. LIII

Micron’s customer agreements, Analog Devices’ acquisitions, Ondas’ GATE deal and Baker Hughes’ power systems position them for AI…