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2788 stories about companies over $10B

@ACapitalLP 1 click

A Capital on X

𝙒𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙝𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙙 𝙩𝙤 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙚𝙤𝙘𝙡𝙤𝙪𝙙 / 𝘼𝙄/𝙃𝙋𝘾 𝙩𝙧𝙖𝙙𝙚 𝙡𝙖𝙨𝙩 𝙬𝙚𝙚𝙠: I like distilling complex topics down to plain English. Here’s my understanding of what happened. Please correct where wrong… $CRWV and its peers rent $NVDA GPUs to AI labs and hyperscalers under multi-year take-or-pay contracts. The capex is so large relative to cash flow that the model only works if they can keep raising tens of billions a year in new financing to build what customers have already signed for. Much of that comes from secured loans backed by specific chips and contracts, while the rest comes from unsecured bonds, converts or stock. Importantly, not all secured debt is non-recourse, and many of $CRWV’s GPU loans are guaranteed by the parent. Still, the secured facilities held up considerably better than the unsecured bonds, which went from ~12% to ~15% yields, while the cost of insuring them via CDS roughly doubled… Nothing fundamental appears to have caused it. No major customer walked, GPU pricing held up, and the quarter looks fine. What happened was a cluster of headlines landing on a nervous market with the 10-year near 5.2% and hundreds of billions of AI debt issuance expected: Chamath calling it a private-credit bubble, an analyst saying the equity could go to zero, Gartner forecasting that over 80% of neoclouds stop operating independently by 2030, a few smaller peers failing to get IPOs and debt deals done. Underneath sat the bigger question of whether neoclouds are durable businesses or really just financing wrappers that hyperscalers eventually insource and cheap open-source models undercut. Once investors doubt the parent can fund growth, the stock falls, which makes the equity leg more dilutive, which worries bondholders more. Credit and equity fed on each other and the whole group fell 10-30% in sympathy. Was it justified? In three parts. (1) The $CRWV unsecured bond move was likely overdone: a company with ~$17bn of liquidity and a $129bn contracted backlog doesn’t suddenly become a distressed credit because of a handful of headlines. But backlog isn’t cash flow, and secured lenders have first claim on specific assets and cash flows, with many loans also carrying parent guarantees. The question for unsecured creditors is how much cash actually makes it back to the parent after servicing the secured debt. Still, a move to ~15% yields looks more like aggressive HF de-risking with headlines as the accelerant than a sudden collapse in the underlying business. (2) The $CRWV equity move was more understandable, just not for the headline reasons: this is a levered financing business whose equity returns depend on the cost of the marginal dollar of capital. When financing gets more expensive, the residual value on every future GW shrinks, and any gap that needs to be filled with equity becomes more dilutive. That said, unsecured bonds trading at 15% doesn’t mean every new GPU deployment costs 15% to finance. A 20% haircut for a stock that may not self-fund until 2030 could be seen as fair, but it ultimately depends on how much parent-level capital is actually required. (3) The group ($CORZ, $CIFR, $WULF) selloff was the least justified: $CRWV finances depreciating GPUs and bears the risk of obsolescence and replacement. The miners converting to HPC are increasingly financing long-lived power and data center infrastructure leased to hyperscalers under 15-20 year contracts, often with the customer owning the GPUs. Their risks are construction, power delivery and financing, not GPU replacement or compute pricing. Different assets, different contracts, different capital structures. Yet the market sold them as though they had the same problem, and that’s where the mispricing most likely sits…
@ChrisCamillo 8 clicks

Chris Camillo on X

I’ve spent a few days thinking about the Tesla Roadster reveal and landed somewhere I haven’t seen much discussion. I’m neither a Tesla fanboy nor a Tesla hater. And I couldn’t care less whether what we saw technically qualifies as a flying car. Three takeaways: (1) The risk of that live demonstration going horribly wrong was real. Almost no CEO would willingly expose their company to that kind of public humiliation for a product with so little financial upside. Elon did. (2) That willingness to attempt the seemingly impossible is what makes Tesla special. It’s also arguably Elon’s greatest contribution to America. He’s helped bring back something we’ve lost. The American spirit of chasing big scary ideas that most people think are impossible. That mindset is spreading across a new generation of founders and its long term impact on America’s future could dwarf anything Tesla ever sells. I think this is deeply underappreciated. (3) Can we just acknowledge how insanely cool that moment was? We’ve reached a strange place culturally where even extraordinary feats of human ingenuity immediately become arguments about why they don’t count. Not everything needs to be a debate. Sometimes we should just be able to stand back together and marvel at what humans are capable of. I’ve been both bullish and critical of Tesla’s ambitions over the years. But watching Elon and his team push the boundaries of what’s possible reminds me why I’m glad we have him. Whether the Roadster ever makes Tesla a dollar or impacts $TSLA stock price is almost beside the point. We need more people willing to risk failure in pursuit of things the rest of us think are impossible. Because when they succeed we all win.

Semtech Analyst Day Review

Semtech raised Q3 guidance and targets $3.2 billion of fiscal 2030 revenue, excluding upside from its AI data-center optical and copper…

SMTC $16B
CV's Substack 10 clicks
@convequity 8 clicks

Convequity on X

We think the gross margin gap between Cerebras ($CBRS) and NVIDIA ($NVDA) says little about which company delivers compute more cheaply. Cerebras reported a 14% gross margin in Q2 2026, against roughly 75% for NVIDIA. That is not a clean comparison, because Cerebras's commercial agreements include customer warrants. A customer warrant gives a buyer of Cerebras compute the right to buy Cerebras shares at an agreed price, adding potential equity upside to the compute it purchases. Cerebras records the value of these incentives over time as a reduction in revenue. Its cost of delivering the compute stays the same, so the full amount comes out of gross profit and its reported gross margin falls too. Add the warrants and a few other items back and Cerebras's Q2 margin was 41%, so the reported gap tells us little about what each company spends to deliver equivalent compute. Cerebras could challenge NVIDIA with attractive economics on selected workloads without matching every capability of NVIDIA's platform. In our view NVIDIA's stronger answer is Feynman reaching customers on schedule with the 3D-stacked SRAM we expect. Stacking more fast memory close to the compute would reduce the need to fetch data from slower external memory, helping NVIDIA narrow the architectural advantage behind Cerebras's fast inference. NVIDIA's adoption of Groq technology could ease some of this pressure, but we believe Groq's current architecture remains weaker than Cerebras's for low-latency inference. The longer Feynman takes to arrive at scale, the more time Cerebras has to win customers.